Abstract-Wireless sensor networks are increasingly being employed for potentially hazardous and critical applications such as monitoring the gas concentration levels in a battle field. In such sensitive applications, it is vital to monitor closely the transient phenomenon and take requisite preventive and corrective actions, if necessary. In such scenarios, due to the presence of adversaries who intend to disrupt the functioning of the system, it becomes imperative to shield our system from false data injection attacks. We propose a novel secure statistical scheme, called SSTF to effectively monitor the transient phenomenon while being immune to false data injection attacks. For achieving our goals, we require the sensors to do a lightweight computation and report a simple statistical digest in addition to the current sensed reading. SSTF is a two-tier system consisting of a statistical inter-sensor testing framework, which is the kernel of our scheme, employed atop an enhanced version of a well-known existing security scheme. We present detailed theoretical analysis and indepth simulations to show the effectiveness of SSTF.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor nodes may be deployed in hostile environments and due to the sheer magnitude of number of nodes deployed in a network, it is infeasible to physically monitor all of them. As such, the network and sensor nodes are susceptible to various kinds of attacks from adversaries. Particularly, the nodes may be captured or compromised, and all the secret information stored in the nodes would be known to the adversary, who can then easily inject false reports about the phenomenon to be sensed into the network. Such an attack is called false data injection attack [1] .
The issue of preventing false data injection attack has attracted substantial research interests [1] - [5] . Most existing schemes assume that each individual sensor reports only the sensed reading. So, if the values reported by sensors do not agree to each other, the data is considered false and rejected by some process akin to majority voting where all other sensors should agree. Consider a scenario where the phenomenon to be sensed has transient temporal and spatial variations. In this case, different sensors may sense different readings and may not agree to each other all the time. Such transient data though genuine and important, will be classified by existing schemes as false and rejected. Motivated by this observation, we address the distinction between genuine transient data vis-a-vis false data in this paper.
Sensor networks are typically organized into clusters. Each cluster has a Cluster Head (CH) responsible for collecting data from sensors in the cluster, doing aggregation and forwarding to a distant Base Station (BS). We propose SSTF, a novel Secure Statistical scheme to distinguish data Transience from False injection in a clustered wireless sensor network. The key ideas of SSTF are twofold. Firstly, each sensor computes a statistical digest of the monitored phenomenon over a moving window of recent readings and reports this digest along with the current reading to CH. By utilizing the statistical digests to aid in decision making and data aggregation at the CH, SSTF is able to distinguish transient data from false data in most scenarios, which is very difficult if only the current sensed readings are reported by individual sensors. Secondly, SSTF requires the CH to perform a series of carefully-designed inter-sensor tests on both readings and digests reported by individual sensors. Since, the false data reported by the compromised node has to pass the inter-sensor tests to escape detection, the impact of false data on the network is significantly restricted. The security framework of SSTF is based on IHHAS [1] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related work in Section II and give the system model and problem statement in Section III. We describe the proposed SSTF scheme in Section IV, present a realization of SSTF using IHHAS in Section V and analyze its security performance in Section VI. Simulation results are presented in Section VII. Finally, we present conclusions and future work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present some relevant research pertaining to false data rejection and secure aggregation.
1) False Data Rejection: Ye et al [2] propose a statistical en-route filtering scheme (SEF), which allows both BS and en-route nodes to detect false data with a certain probability. Zhu et al [1] propose an Interleaved Hopby-Hop Authentication Scheme (IHHAS) where pairwise keys are established between nodes t + 1 hops away and up to t compromised nodes can be tolerated. Yang et al [3] present a commutative cipher based en-route filtering scheme (CCEF) which is based on public-key algorithms that have been reported not suitable for sensor networks due to limited resource capacity of sensor nodes [6] . Yu et al [4] present a dynamic en-route filtering scheme for filtering false data injection; alleviating the constraint of fixed path requirement between BS and CH in [1] , [3] ; thus, making the scheme better suited to deal with dynamic topology of sensor networks. Zhang et al [7] present the interleaved authentication for filtering false data in multipath routing based sensor networks.
2) Secure Aggregation: Przydatek et al [5] present SIA for secure aggregation in sensor networks. It focuses on reducing trust in BS, when queried by a trusted outside user and gives schemes to compute a few aggregation primitives. Mahimkar et al [8] present SecureDAV which uses Merkle Hash Trees to avoid over-reliance on CH. Since attacker does not know the cluster key, it cannot generate the full signature. Assuming a trusted BS, Wagner [9] discusses which aggregation functions can be meaningfully computed with resilience. However, [9] does not consider any in-network aggregation and only BS does the aggregation. Hu and Evans [10] propose a secure hop-by-hop aggregation scheme that works if one node is compromised. Yang et al [11] present SDAP which partitions sensor nodes in a tree topology and performs a commitment-based hop-by-hop aggregation in each subtree to generate a group aggregated result.
3) Novelty of our work: There is significant difference between past research and our work. In general, past research has focused on computing the aggregates (a single value e.g. sum, count, min, max, etc) securely or accepting the aggregate being correct to a certain probability. Similarly, false data rejection protocols involve accepting or rejecting single values which are proven equal (with some tolerance) or not equal to each other. As discussed earlier, this leads to rejection of even genuine but transient data and we cannot observe the variations in the phenomenon being sensed. Thus, we focus on solving a novel problem: how to observe a time-variant phenomenon by accepting the genuine transient data and at the same time limit the effect of false data. In general, it is difficult to distinguish between transient and false data if sensor reading is the only information reported. In our scheme, the sensor nodes also send a simple statistical digest along with the reading to CH as opposed to sending only the reading in the existing schemes.
III. MODELS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT A. System Model
We consider a clustered wireless sensor network that is partitioned into distinct clusters after deployment. Each cluster has a Cluster Head (CH) and a set of sensor nodes, which gather information and transmit it to CH. CH does decision making and aggregation on the information received from the sensors and forwards an aggregated report to a distant Base Station (BS). We do not address clustering-related issues such as CH selection or rotation in this work. Distinct clusters could be sensing different phenomena, however we assume that all sensors in a single cluster sense the same phenomenon. The sampling rate of sensors is dependent on the maximum temporal change in the phenomenon as well as the maximum spatial diffusion rate. Instead of sending only the sensed reading to CH, each sensor does a lightweight computation over a moving window of recent sensed readings and sends a simple statistical digest to CH at periodic intervals.
B. Threat Model
Sensor nodes may be compromised or physically captured. All secret information stored in compromised nodes can be accessed by adversaries and they can launch multiple attacks like dropping or altering the message contents going through them, so as to prevent BS from receiving authentic sensor readings. Also, there may be colluded attacks where two or more nodes collaborate to let the false reports escape detection en-route to BS.
C. Problem Statement
Due to time and space variant nature of the phenomenon being sensed, instantaneous sensor readings recorded by individual sensors in a cluster may vary. In a monitoring application, it is often critical to observe such transient but genuine data and report them with low false positives. On the other hand, a compromised node (or group of colluding compromised nodes) will try to inject a false reading into the network and our aim is to minimize the impact of false injection on the aggregation process and detect it eventually. Thus, we identify the following design goals for our scheme: (i) It should distinguish genuine transient data from injected false data and report them with low false positives; (ii) False data injection should have minimal impact on the aggregation process and be detected as soon as possible; and (iii) It should tolerate a large number of compromised nodes.
IV. PROPOSED SSTF SCHEME SSTF is in short for Secure Statistical scheme to distinguish data Transience from False injection. Our proposed scheme is a two-tier system with a statistical framework on top of a security framework. Such modular design enables us to integrate the statistical framework on top of any existing security scheme with necessary adaptation and enhancement. Section IV-A presents our proposed statistical framework and Section V describes one particular realization of the SSTF scheme by integrating the proposed framework with an enhanced version of a well-known security scheme, IHHAS [1] .
A. Statistical Framework
Statistical framework is the kernel of our proposed scheme. This framework can be applied on top of any security scheme to achieve the goal of preserving data transience while being immune to false data injection attacks. The statistical framework can be divided into four categories of operation: Individual Sensor Behavior; Cluster Head Behavior; Sensor Endorsement; and Enroute Nodes and Base Station Behavior. Table I summarizes the notations used in this section. Sample variance reported by Vk in the i-th report.
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The i-th aggregated report generated by CH in the format of (rAgi,/Agi, (fgA) aggregated mean and variance can be computed by using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE): 3) Report Endorsement: Requires that at least t + 1 nodes agree on the report for it to be considered a valid report. Every participating node computes two MACs (Message Authentication Codes) over the event, one using its shared key with BS (called individual MAC) and other using the shared key with its upper associated node (called pairwise MAC). Then its sends the MACs to CH. CH collects MACs from all the participating nodes, authenticates them, wraps them into a single report and forwards it to BS. The format of the IHHAS report is as follows (assuming t= 3): R E, Ci, {vI, V2, V3, CH}, XMAC(E), {MAC(KCHU4, E), MAC(Kv3u37 E), (2) MAC(Kv2u2), E), MAC(KVlul, E)}.
where MAC(KV,u,, E), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are the pairwise MACs and XMAC is a compressed MAC computed by CH using individual MACs as given below:
4) En-route filtering: Every en-route node verifies the MAC computed by its lower associated node, and then removes the MAC from the received report. If verification succeeds, it attaches a new MAC based on pairwise key with its upper associated node and forwards it to BS. 5) Base station verification: BS verifies the report after receiving it. If the BS detects that t + 1 nodes have endorsed the report correctly, it accepts the report; otherwise, it discards the report.
B. Limitations of IHHAS
While IHHAS works well with the system model described in [1] , it overlooks the following scenarios. 1) Large cluster size not addressed: Designed with the implicit assumption that there are exactly t + 1 nodes in a cluster (including CH), IHHAS works well as long as the number of compromised nodes (within cluster or enroute) is no larger than t. With more than t + 1 nodes in the cluster, association discovery phase of IHHAS works incorrectly since it can not guarantee a unique lower association node to an en-route node. We generalize IHHAS to accommodate more than t + 1 cluster nodes.
2) ID attack not considered: The format of the IH-HAS report is given in Eq. (2). All en-route nodes check only the pairwise MACs and do not verify the IDs of sensor nodes endorsing the reports. Only BS can verify the node IDs and the XMAC. However, this makes the scheme prone to ID attack, where adversary can simply modify the node ID list {vI, v2, v3, CH} so that BS is not able to verify the XMAC with the modified list and all en-route nodes waste energy forwarding such false data. To overcome this limitation, we make a simple improvement to IHHAS wherein each node also includes its node ID in the MAC contents and the en-route nodes verify node ID in the list with that in the MAC contents.
3) Not suitable for distinct reports from sensors: IHHAS works perfectly when all the sensors agree on an event E, which means that E could be a logical or boolean value so that all sensors agree on exactly the same thing. For example, sensors responding either "Yes" or "No" to a query whether the room temperature is higher than 1500F, would be such an event. In a scenario where CH needs to do aggregation and all the sensors could report possibly different readings and digests which would generally be the case in practice, the computation of XMAC as in Eq. (3) is not possible. Further, it may incur infeasible communication overheads to forward all individual MACs to BS instead of compressing them.
C. Enhancing IHHAS to Integrate with SSTF
To address above inadequacies, following modifications are done to association discovery phase, final report preparation by CH and enroute filtering phase in IHHAS.
1) Association Discovery: There are total T -> t + 1 nodes (including CH in the cluster. As in IHHAS, BS sends Hello message to enable a node discover its upper association node. On receiving a Hello message from BS, a node attaches its own ID to the Hello message before re-broadcasting it. The maximum number of node IDs that are included in Hello message is t + 1. CH divides the cluster nodes (including itself) into t + 1 groups, gi (1 < i < t + 1) and each group has a minimum of 1 and a maximum of T = 4] nodes. When CH receives the Hello message containing t+ 1 IDs from its previous hop node, it assigns the t + 1 IDs to the t + 1 groups. Thus, all the nodes in a group have a single upper association node. Also, CH keeps a list of the nodes in each group. Example: Fig. 2 illustrates the association discovery process (BS "Hello" and cluster "ACK"). There are total 10 nodes. When CH receives the hello message (u4, u, u2, ul), it divides all the nodes into 4 groups:
(gl(v5, v2, vl),g2(v6, v4, v), g3(v9, v8, v7),g4(CH)).
There can be a maximum of 3 nodes in a group. Then it assigns each of (u4,u8,u2,ul) to (g4,g3,g2,gl) respectively. During the cluster ACK process, the acks consists of group ID with the group nodes so that the en-route nodes come to know of its lower associated nodes. For example, when ul receives (g4(CH), g3(v9, v8, v7), g2(v6,v4,v3), gl(v5, v2, vl)), it knows that its lower associated nodes ul®g (BS) (BS,u6) (BS,u6,u5) (BS,u6,u5,u4) (u6,u5,u4,u3) (u5,u4,u3,u2) (u4,u3,u2,ul) , v3) ) to u2. The process proceeds similarly at each en-route node. U We define a new term Report Limit, 0 which is the maximum number of reports from a group that will be used by CH. It is easy to see that 0 < 9. CH needs at least t + 1 reports and at most 0 reports from each group will be used. To satisfy this, our scheme requires that at least p nodes in the cluster report, where p is given by: p = max (t+ 1, (x ( )l + 0) (4) Note that even though the maximum number of compromised nodes that the scheme can accept is still t; the en-route filtering phase will work only if less than (t+ 1)/0 nodes are compromised. If N, (t+l < N, <7) nodes are compromised, though BS will eventually detect the false report, the en-route nodes may not be able to detect it and keep on forwarding the false report. 0 is useful in the en-route filtering phase, see Section V-C.3.
2 ( 5) MAC(K-3, RAgi) MAC(Kv4, RAgi). The report R that CH finally generates and forwards to BS consists of the aggregated report RAgi, cluster ID Ci, ID list of the t + 1 endorsing nodes, the XMAC as computed above and the t + 1 distinct pairwise MACs, and a special counter t, initially set to zero. For example, in Fig. 2 , the report R generated by CH is:
{MAC(KV4"12, (RAgi, V4)), MAC(KV3tl2, (RAgi, V3)), (6) MAC(KV2"11 (RAgi,7V2)), MAC(Kvlu ,, (RAgi 7 VI))})
The order of the pairwise MACs in R corresponds to that in the cluster acknowledgment message during the association discovery phase so that a node receiving R knows which pairwise MACs could be from its lower association nodes. t, is a special counter updated by enroute nodes to keep in track how many consecutive nodes have not been able to verify any of the MACs. It is described more in the En-route Filtering phase next.
3) En- VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS Individual sensor nodes or CH can lie about the measurements, digests and aggregated reports. All these attacks are collectively referred to as content attacks. In this section, we present a brief analysis on various content attacks. Throughout the analysis, for the sake of simplicity, the index for sliding window in the reports is omitted. A/ -I1'k K" k ;VkG [1,TI,k#j (7) vwwhere (P'k, o2) is the distribution reported by sensor Vk and T is the number of nodes in the cluster, w is size of sliding window.
The reading reported by sensor should be within limits to pass the bin test. The compromised node wants a false reading r' = r + Ar to get accepted, where r is the true reading measured by the sensor. We are interested in computing the maximum possible expected distortion that an attacker can inject without being detected i.e. we want to maximize E[Ar,Ar is accepted].
We can obtain [13] the optimal Ar = A* as: (8) where Vr = max (ri) -min (ri), ri being the reported individual sensor readings. cr72 is the compromised aggregated variance. Also, the maximum expectation of E[Ar,Ar is accepted] is given by [13] Let rAg be the genuine aggregated reading. When the adversary injects a false reading r' = r + A,r the aggregated reading rAg is given by:
Number of Samples in the Largest Bin (10) where ri are the genuine readings reported by other sensors. Thus, the impact of the false injection on rAg, denoted by F, is: Ar
Number of Samples in the Largest Bin' *ll 2) Attack Strategies: There are two strategies that the adversary can adopt to inject false data and distort rAg. As can be seen from Eq. (11), the adversary can either attempt to maximize Ar or minimize the number of samples in the largest bin to increase F. a) Strategy 1: First strategy is to report a small false variance such that the aggregated variance and hence the bin width is reduced. This is equivalent to decreasing the denominator in Eq. (11) . As a result some of the genuine readings are excluded from aggregation and hence, the false data injected by the adversary can have more impact. However, due to reduced bin width, the distortion Ar that can be introduced into the reading is also small. b) Strategy 2: The other strategy is to report a large variance such that the aggregated variance is increased. This results in a larger bin width and hence, larger distortion Ar can be introduced in the reading.
3) Selecting the Best Strategy: Let o* be the genuine aggregated standard deviation and o* and o7 be the false aggregated standard deviation computed using strategy 1 and strategy 2 respectively.
Consider Fig. 4 . Let Po, PI, P2 denote the probability that a sample lies in the bins AiDi([t i 2o*; i = 0, 1, 2) for the case of no compromised node, one compromised node using strategy 1 and one compromised node using strategy 2 respectively. S denotes the number of eligible sensors. The bin size i.e. the expected number of samples that lie in the bins AoBo, A1B1, A2B2 is given by SFP0, SF1, SFP2 respectively.
From Fig. 4 , we can see that:
The adversary introduces a distortion of A* according to Eq. (8) . For the case when A* = oj* , from Eq. (11), the impact on rAg using the first and second strategies is: ¶i 4 '71 and ¶2 = gP2 respectively. From Eq. (12), it can be easily seen that: U* U* F1 <F2 (13) implying ¶2 > ¶. Hence, the attacker can cause maximum distortion in rAg when it adopts the second strategy. So, the compromised node should report a high variance. For maximum impact, the adversary reports a fake variance equal to oc. Similar analysis can be done for the case, when A* = 2o7g VVr (refer to Eq. (8)) and it is seen here too that attacker can cause maximum distortion in rAg by faking its variance as oc.
Hence, the adversary reports j*2 = 00. Consequently, regardless of the ,u' being reported, the effect on ,Upg and *2~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r
A2g is given by:
Ag (k_ 1Uf) 1 where j is the index of the compromised sensor node. Further, from Eq. (11), the effect on rAg is:
where C = SFP1 and A* is given by:
A* = CAg -, <(Ag(6 (17) where i is the index of the eligible sensors. Further, the aggregated reading rAg should satisfy the bin test at each endorsing sensor vi. Let rAg be the true aggregated reading, and r[g be the maximum acceptable false reading reported by compromised CH. It is easy to see that, if CH reports r[g = min(ri) + 2min(cri), it will always be accepted. Thus, CH can distort the true readings by a maximum of rAg -min(ri) + 2min(cri).
Since our security framework is based on IHHAS, our scheme is equally resilient as IHHAS to other security attacks, such as outsider attacks, replay attacks, cluster insider attacks and en-route insider attacks. Due to space limitations, discussions on those security attacks are omitted.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We study the performance of our scheme by simulation. We compare our scheme with a simple majority voting scheme to show the effectiveness of our scheme in preserving transient data. We also demonstrate the limited impact of false data in the presence of compromised nodes under various attack strategies.
A. Simulation Setup
The wireless sensor network is divided into circular clusters. Each cluster is responsible for sensing the timevarying phenomenon in its region. We focus on one particular cluster shown in Fig. 5 there is no variation, the readings are pretty constant and all the nodes agree, however, as the variation rate increases, the readings amongst sensors do not agree with each other anymore, and more and more genuine data are excluded from aggregation. Thus the system starts losing "important" information during data transience which is not desired. We can see in Fig. 6 , almost 60% genuine data is lost at high variation rate.
2) Limiting the Impact of False Data Injection: In Fig. 7 , we show the effect of false data with respect to different phenomenon variation rates and false injection. X-axis represents the standard deviation of the varying source data which is indicative of phenomenon variation. Y-axis represents the false injection. Z-axis represents the effect on rAg expressed as a percentage of the source data standard deviation. As discussed above, it can be seen that, for a constant false injection, the impact of false data increases with the phenomenon variation rate. On the other hand for a constant rate, as the false injection is increased, the impact of false data first increases and then decreases and becomes zero as the false injection is increased further. This is attributed to the fact that the false reading remains no longer a part of the largest bin and is excluded from aggregation. It is also observed Fig. 8 . Demonstrating the effectiveness of SSTF. Shown are two attack strategies. In (b), the attacker chooses to inject false data that complies to the bin test and in (c), the attacker injects arbitrarily random false data.
that impact on rAg is very limited (up to 2% of source data standard deviation) which conforms to our security analysis (refer to Section VI-A). Fig. 8 further demonstrates the effectiveness of SSTF in limiting the impact of false data. Shown is a snapshot of a randomly varying source, the Y-axis represents the value in units of the phenomenon. The X-axis represents the report index, a stretch of 100 reports is shown and we can see that SSTF closely resembles the source data. In Fig. 8(a) , there is no attack and SSTF is close to the source data, it deviates only due to the delay incurred for the phenomenon to propagate from source to sensor nodes. Fig. 8(b) shows the case when attacker does a subtle attack by reporting false values that pass the distribution test and bin test. However, the impact on the aggregated reading is almost negligible. In Fig. 8(c) , the attacker injects arbitrarily random false data, which doesn't alter the result of SSTF either since the injected false data is excluded during the testing process.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We present SSTF, a secure statistical scheme to distinguish data transience from false injection in clustered sensor networks. We develop a statistical framework which is the kernel of SSTF and enhance the IHHAS scheme to be used as the underlying security framework. In contrast to existing false data rejection schemes, SSTF requires each individual sensor to report a statistical digest, in addition to the sensed reading and we emphasize the merits of this strategy to effectively monitor transient variations in the phenomenon. Through detailed security analysis and intensive simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme in preserving the transient data while being resilient to false data injection attacks.
SSTF is designed primarily for applications requiring periodic reporting and monitoring. Future work includes applying SSTF to query-based setup, wherein the sensors respond to a query from the BS, and integration of SSTF with other frameworks such as [4] for operating in a dynamically changing topology or [14] to make it work in a structure-free aggregation setup. We also plan to implement SSTF on a sensor network test-bed.
